the distribution relative to higher-skilled groups, but also an absolute decline in lower-tail real wages. If voters wish to maintain a target benefit-wage ratio, either for reasons of equity with the nonwelfare working poor or to control work disincentives, a fall in the low-skill wage could lead voters to reduce welfare benefit levels. This stands in contrast to the standard view that a reduction in unskilled wages, by raising poverty rates, leads voters to increase benefit levels.
We test this hypothesis with a panel of U.S. state-level data over the period 1969-1992 with information on both benefits and low-skilled wages. Our preferred test uses now-conventional state fixed effects estimation, where estimates are based on the correlation between changes over time in welfare benefits, on the one hand, and changes over time in low-skilled wages, on the other, across different states. We find considerable evidence that the drift in wages has played a contributory role. At the state level, year-to-year changes in benefits and low-skill wages are positively correlated across states, both unconditionally and conditional on a set of other regressors including controls for income and price effects. In addition, long-term trends in benefits and wages (after smoothing out fluctuations) are also positively related across states.
An additional feature of our analysis relates to the median voter model which underlies our analysis and most of those in the literature. While we take the median voter model as a maintained hypothesis in our work, we use data on individual preferences for welfare to circumvent the aggregation problem that arises when only statelevel data on median income and population characteristics are available, a problem discussed by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) . Using a question on welfare preferences from a nationwide survey (the General Social Survey), we are able to estimate the income and socioeconomic characteristics of the median-preference voter in each state and use those as regression determinants of the state benefit level, thereby freeing the analysis from the very restrictive assumptions given by Bergstrom and Goodman necessary to justify the use of, and interpret the results from using, aggregate data.
The next section of the paper briefly describes trends in welfare benefits and related variables. Following that, we discuss conceptual aspects of the hypothesis in more detail. After a discussion of modeling and data considerations, we present our empirical results. A summary concludes the paper.
Trends in welfare benefits in the U.S.
That welfare benefits have declined markedly over the last twenty years is well-known. Fig. 1 shows the trend in the sum of the real AFDC and Food Stamp guarantees, the maximum payments for a family of four with no other income, over the period . The essentially monotonic downward trend reflects a more or less constant real Food Stamp benefit (Food Stamps are indexed to inflation) and a nominal AFDC benefit which has been rising slower than the rate of inflation. In the early 1990s, some states also reduced their nominal AFDC benefits. Fig. 2 shows the time trend in the real weekly wage (1987 dollars) measured at the 25th percentile of the distribution. 1 The figure shows that this measure of the unskilled wage declined for most of the period, although with fluctuations around trend, until the late 1980s, after which it has risen slightly. Other figures (not shown) show similar declines for the wages of high school graduates and at the 10th percentile of the wage distribution. 3 shows the trend in the ratio of AFDC and Food Stamp benefits to the 25th-percentile wage over the period. While the ratio exhibits some fluctuation, it has fallen fairly steadily over time. However, the rate of decline is considerably reduced from that of the benefit alone in Fig. 1 . We take this observation as the starting point for our analysis. 
Modeling the influence of wages on benefits
There is an extensive public-economics literature on models of the state-level determination of AFDC benefits (Pauly, 1973; Orr, 1976; Orr, 1979; Gramlich, 1982; Plotnick and Winter, 1985; Moffitt, 1984; Moffitt, 1990a; Plotnick, 1986; Brown and Oates, 1987; Johnson, 1988; Shroder, 1995 and Wilhelm, 1996 , to name just a few). The standard model of redistribution from nonpoor to poor assumes that the existence of a group of poor persons imposes a negative externality on the utility of the nonpoor; optimal desires for redistribution then involve a balance between the marginal utility of redistribution and the income and efficiency losses attendant upon it (Atkinson, 1987) . Because the AFDC program is largely a state-level program in the U.S., the literature on the determinants of AFDC benefits has translated the model of optimal redistribution to the local level, first theoretically by Pauly (1973) and then, in the first serious empirical application, by Orr (1976) . The model assumes that each voter cares about his own income and, altruistically, about the income of a representative poor family, and that majority rule in a single-issue election leads to a benefit chosen by the median-preference voter. The other articles referenced above pursued theoretical and empirical variants on this theme. In the standard forms of these models, a decrease in the income of the poor leads to a increase in the marginal benefit of redistribution and hence to an increase in the equilibrium welfare benefit. We wish to posit models that could generate the opposite result. We base our model, as is typical in the literature, on the utility function of the nonpoor voter on the assumption that poor voters are insufficiently large in number to generate a median voter. We consider three different types of variables affecting the utility of a representative nonpoor voter: consumption (C), hours of work (H), and other socioeconomic characteristics (X). Again following the standard formulation, we separate the arguments of the utility function into those of the individual himself and those of other individuals in the population. A general formulation of this utility function is: (1) where C, H, and X denote quantities for the nonpoor individual himself and those variables in curly brackets with subscript −1 denote those variables for the residual set of individuals, presumed to include the target population for redistribution. It is important to note that a function as general as Eq. 1 can capture preferences for redistribution based not only on the absolute levels of C and H of the target population, but on their levels relative to those of the nonpoor individual himself. Thus if voters have a target level of inequality per se in mind, represented perhaps by a desired ratio of consumption, this can be captured in Eq. 1. -Relative income‖ theories of redistribution are of this type. Relatedly, the presence of the X characteristics is capable of representing not only the effect on redistributional preferences of the characteristics of the individual himself and those of the members of the target population, but also of the relationship between the two. This could matter if similarity or dissimilarity in characteristics between the donor and the recipient influence preferences, as in models of -social distance‖ (Kristov et al., 1992 and Cutler et al., 1993) .
A stylized specialization of Eq. 1 can capture most of the important preference influences of interest here. Suppose that the target population can be considered to be composed of two homogeneous groups, one consisting of poor individuals receiving public assistance (A) and one consisting of poor individuals not receiving public assistance (NA). With additional separability assumptions between C and H, we have: (2) where we have taken the labor supply of the nonpoor individual himself (H) to be exogenous. The budget constraint facing the individual is
where Y is the income level of the individual, B is the level of the welfare benefit, R is the number of individuals on welfare (i.e., the caseload), N is the population in the state, and k(Y) is a function nondecreasing in Y which represents the form of the tax function in the state. Thus Q(Y) is the price of a one-dollar increase in B to an individual with income Y, and that price depends on the state per-capita caseload. We ignore federal subsidies for the time being.
To adequately capture the effects of benefits and unskilled wages on desired benefits, we add a set of functions describing the consumption, hours, and welfare-take-up decisions of poor individuals as follows, where W is the level of the wage for unskilled workers:
Given these functions, the optimal desired B can be obtained by taking the derivative of Eq. 2 w.r.t. B to obtain the marginal utility of increasing the benefit: (8) where ε= [(B/R) (∂R/∂B) ] is the elasticity of the caseload w.r.t. the benefit. Optimal benefits are chosen by balancing the disutility of the reduction in consumption induced by the additional taxes needed to raise benefits, including any caseload increase that results, and the net utility of increasing the consumption of the poor at the expense of some reductions in their hours of work.
Although it is often presumed that higher income voters are more altruistic than middle-income voters, and that welfare benefits are in this sense a normal good, this does not imply that desired benefits are positively related to income. Taking the derivative of Eq. 8 w.r.t. Y, we have:
While it is true that the middle term in this expression implies (assuming that [1−Q′(Y)B] is positive) that declining marginal utility of own consumption (V 11 <0) leads to an increase in the desire for redistribution as income rises, the first term shows that an increase in tax payments as income rises may offset this. Less obvious is the third term, whose sign is determined by the sign of V 21 , the effect of an increase in own consumption on the marginal utility of increasing the consumption of poor welfare recipients. Although there could be some type of -pure‖ positive income effect on redistribution, reflected in V 21 >0, it is also possible that sympathy for the poor falls as -distance‖ from them (in income or consumption terms) grows; this would lead to V 21 <0 and hence a decline in preferred benefits among those with higher income.
An implication of this point that is important for our empirical findings is that income effects may differ in sign depending on whether Y is increased only for the nonpoor voter in question, holding constant the income and consumption of the poor, or whether the entire income distribution shifts (e.g., through economic growth over time). If, for example, V 21 is a negative function of the C/C P A ratio, a shift upward in the entire distribution could generate a positive income effect whereas an increase in the income of one voter alone could generate a negative income effect. Empirical counterparts that would correspond to these different comparisons are, on the one hand, cross-sectional comparisons of benefit preferences of voters with different incomes -where absolute income effects cannot be separated from relative income effects -versus, on the other hand, comparisons over time of the benefit preferences of a population whose entire income distribution has shifted upward or downward.
The effect of the unskilled wage on benefit preferences is of key interest to us. Taking the partial derivative of Eq. 8 w.r.t. W, we have: (10) The first two terms represent the effects of a change in W on the welfare caseload, which affects the tax price to the voter. These effects are ambiguous in sign because, although ∂Q/∂W<0, the signs of ∂ε/∂W and V 21 are not signable; the latter again represents relative income, social distance influences (in fact, a drop in poor consumption from a decline in W could increase social distance and lead to less desire for redistribution). The third and fourth terms represent effects working through the relative preferences of voters for the consumption and work hours of poor nonwelfare recipients. Of particular interest are the effects working through the cross utility terms V 23 and Z 12 , which represent the voter's relative preferences for welfare and nonwelfare consumption and work hours. If V 23 >0, for example, as would arise if voters wish to maintain a target consumption ratio between the two poor groups, a decline in the wage will lead to a decline in the marginal utility of benefits. If Z 12 >0, this could lead to the opposite result, however-if low wages cause the hours of work of nonwelfare recipients to decline, voters may be less bothered by the work disincentives experienced by welfare recipients.
Thus the model offers at least three reasons why benefits may fall if unskilled wages also fall: (i) falling wages induce greater caseloads and hence drive up the cost of a marginal increase in benefits; (ii) associated with the increase in caseload is a increase in work disincentives, which voters may dislike; and (iii) falling wages may create a gap between welfare and nonwelfare working poor which voters may wish to reduce by benefit reductions.
Turning to the preferences of the poor voters themselves, those preferences are, as noted earlier, unlikely to be decisive in voting; however, their preferences do matter because they help determine who the median voter is. Poor voters are likely to prefer higher welfare benefits for self-interest reasons, and may prefer them even if they are not on welfare because they might go on in the future; for them, benefits may play the role of insurance (Varian, 1980) . 2 Consequently, we should expect preferences for benefits to fall with income at the lower ranges.
Aggregation of preferences
Now consider a model in which different voters i=1,…, N s in different states s=1,…, S have preferences of the type we have just described. We can write a reduced-form benefit-demand function for individual i in state s as: (11) where B is * is the desired benefit level, Q is is the tax price, Y is is income, X is is a composite set of the X characteristics previously defined; and W s is the level of the unskilled wage in the state. We expect price effects to be negative and income effects to be positive or negative, as described earlier, and we wish to test whether unskilled wages positively affect the benefit.
We take the median voter model, originally developed by Hotelling (1929 ), Bowen (1943 , as a maintained hypothesis for our analysis. Although stable public choice under majority rule requires single-peaked preferences (which may not hold) as well as single-issue elections (whereas welfare benefits are chosen by state legislatures and governors who run in multiple-issue elections), it is unfortunately the case that equilibria in multiple issue elections are difficult to obtain except under very simple preference assumptions or without additional political structure imposed. We therefore leave progress on this front to future research. Thus, denoting the individual with median B is * in a state by i=m, the actual welfare benefit in state s is: (12) Even with the maintained assumption of median voter choice, however, major estimation difficulties have arisen in the literature, some of which interact with our aim of estimating effects of state-level variables like the unskilled wage. The most serious difficulty is that neither Eq. 11 nor Eq. 12 can ordinarily be estimated because Eq. 11 requires information on individual preferences, which are generally unavailable, and because Eq. 12 requires knowledge of the characteristics of the median voter, which are also generally unknown because the median-preference voter, even in a micro data set, cannot be identified. Because the demand function in Eq. 11 contains multiple variables, the median of the dependent variable does not correspond in general to the median of any of the variables in the function, including income; the median of the dependent variable depends on the distribution of all of the variables and on the unknown coefficients which weight up those variables to a preference value.
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The conventional solution to this problem is to use aggregate, state-level variables in the estimation of Eq. 12 instead-specifically, the median income in the state, a tax price based on median income, and the mean population characteristics in place of X. Unfortunately, the conditions under which estimation of such an equation yields estimates of the function in Eq. 12 are extremely stringent, as demonstrated by Bergstrom and Goodman (1973) . The most important restriction is that the income distributions within all subgroups defined by the X characteristics within a state must be proportional shifts of one another. The difficulty with this assumption in our case is that, if it fails, the unskilled wage in the state may proxy deviations in the income distribution from proportionality and hence deviations in the income of the median-preference person from median income. Hence any significant estimated effects of the unskilled wage may be spurious and may reflect influences of, rather than on, the median voter. 4 Our approach to this problem is to first estimate conventional models using aggregate state-level data, which will be valid under the Bergstrom-Goodman conditions, but also to use a micro-level data set on welfare preferences to obtain the actual income and characteristics of the voter with median preferences. Welfare preference information is available from a survey, the General Social Survey (GSS), which asks direct questions about preferences for welfare spending. We use the GSS to estimate demand functions for individual preferences as a function of income and other characteristics, and then apply these estimated functions to the Current Population Survey (CPS) on a state-by-state basis to determine the median-preference individual and his or her characteristics (we use the CPS because the GSS sample sizes by state are too small for reliable estimation of the median). We then use these characteristics in Eq. 12 and compare the results to those of the aggregate model. This will furnish an implicit test of the Bergstrom-Goodman conditions as a whole, and will also provide us with an estimate of the effects of the unskilled wage not dependent on any of those conditions. 
Results: conventional aggregate model
For the aggregate analysis we employ a data set consisting of all U.S. states in each year from 1969 to 1992. Definitions and descriptive statistics for these variables are presented in Table 1 . The dependent variable is the log of the real monthly AFDC benefit per recipient. We also test the AFDC guarantee (maximum amount payable to a family of four), which has been used in a fair number of previous studies. We prefer benefits per recipient because they more accurately reflect the influence of deductions and other benefit-formula factors not easily captured in the guarantee; on the other hand, the benefit captures some income and family-size variation as well. Fortunately, the two variables are highly positively correlated and our results, for the most part, do not depend on which measure is used. The regressors in the equations include total personal income per capita in the state, the benefit price assuming uniform taxation and with federal matching (hence k(Y)=1 and the tax price is multiplied by one minus the federal matching rate), an unskilled wage variable in the state, and a set of demographic and political characteristics (percent black, percent aged, etc.). 6 The wage variable is computed from the March files of the CPS from 1969 to 1992. In each year, we compute the real average weekly wage (1987 dollars) of all workers in each state aged 16-64 and then select the wage at the 25th percentile of the distribution to proxy the wage for unskilled workers. We also compute other percentile points, the 10th percentile for example, and test them later in the paper. We use weekly wages rather than hourly wages because the CPS does not have a good measure of hours worked per week over the years prior to 1976. Past work has indicated, however, that hourly and weekly wages are highly correlated. 7 Table 2 shows the results using the log of real AFDC benefits per recipient as the dependent variable. Column (1) includes only the income and price variables, as well as year dummies, and reveals significant positive and negative effects of each, respectively. Column (2) shows the effect of adding the unskilled wage, which has a significantly negative coefficient. However, when state-level fixed effects are added, as shown in column (3), the coefficient reverses in sign and becomes significantly positive.
The change of results with the introduction of state fixed effects is common in the literature and is unsurprising. It arises in the present case because many high-benefit states in the U.S. also have low real wages but, over time, states with more rapidly falling wages have experienced more rapidly falling benefits.
8 Since a specification test clearly rejects column (2), the implication is that the cross-sectional relationship is spuriously picking up fixed unobserved taste and other omitted state-level variables that are positively correlated with benefits but negatively correlated with wages.
The positive correlation between changes in benefits and wages over time is strong enough that it can be seen from a simple examination of the relationship between unconditional growth rates of benefits and wages by region, as shown in Table 3 . 9 The table shows the change in average log benefits and log wages between two 11-year periods, 1969-1980 and 1981-1992 (our time period split in half). Log wages are measured relative to the median, to control for differences in the growth rate of the whole wage distribution and not just its lower portion. As the table indicates, benefits fell the most between the 1970s and 1980s in the mid-Atlantic region (New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania), and fell the least in the Pacific region (California, Alaska, Hawaii, and northwestern states). At the same time, inequality in the lower-tail of the wage distribution increased the most in the first group and increased less (in fact, decreased) for the latter group of states. Other groups fit this pattern as well: the industrial states of the Midwest (Michigan and Ohio, for example), experienced large increases in inequality and also reduced AFDC benefits by sizable amounts. The southeastern states in the U.S., which reduced benefits by very little compared to the rest of the country, also experienced little growth in inequality.
10 Table 2 . State-level regression analysis of determinants of AFDC benefits Table 3 . Trends in wage inequality and AFDC benefits by region, 1969-1980 to 1981-1992 Returning to column (3) of Table 2 , it can also be seen that, while price effects are not much affected by the introduction of state fixed effects, income effects fall markedly. Errors-in-variables in the income variable is one explanation for this reduction, but cross-sectional bias (high income states have high benefits) may also be at work. We will return to this issue when we use micro-level data on incomes. The fourth column in the table adds the demographic variables in the state. The coefficients on these variables are jointly significant. Their introduction further reduces the estimated income effect but has no effect on the wage coefficient.
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In columns (5) and (6) we test whether our results are robust to the presence of differential growth rates of benefits in different states by adding interaction variables between the state dummies and a time trend. With these state-trend fixed effects included, the coefficients on the other regressors in the equation reflect their relationships with year-to-year benefit movements apart from, or on top of, linear trends. The table shows that adding these effects changes a number of the coefficients but, while reducing the magnitude of the wage effect, leaves it positive and significant (the interactions are jointly significant). In column (6) the wage effect that works through the state-year trend is added back into the equation by decomposing the wage variable into two components, one equal to the value predicted from a first-stage regression of the wage on year, state, and statetrend dummies, and the other equal to the residual from this regression; the state-trend fixed effects are now omitted so that their effect can work through the predicted log wage variable. This procedure is equivalent to an instrumental variables procedure in which the state-trend dummies are used as instruments for the wage and generate consistent estimates under the alternative model in which state-specific year-to-year wage fluctuations around trend contain measurement error but there are no true state-trend fixed effects. 12 The results show a much larger positive effect of the predicted wage on benefits than for the actual wage -and, consistent with this, a smaller effect of the residual wage (the average effect in column (4) falls necessarily between the two estimates in column (6)). Thus we find that, indeed, states with larger trend growth rates of unskilled wagesor, more accurately, slower declines -have also had slower trend declines in welfare benefit levels, confirming the results in Table 3 in a regression context. 13 We conduct a number of additional sensitivity tests to this model and these results, including tests using different percentile points for both the low-skill wage and household income, using different measures of the wage, and testing for the effects of endogeneity in the tax price and other variables. However, we postpone a discussion of these tests until we use micro data to reformulate the median voter model.
Results: micro-based median voter model
In this section we report results using a micro-level survey on welfare preferences together with the CPS to determine the characteristics of the individual with median preferences in each state.
General social survey
The GSS is a nationally-representative, repeated cross-section survey which has been conducted every year since 1972 (except 1979, 1981, and 1992) and which interviews approximately 1500 individuals each year (Davis and Smith, 1992) . Questions are asked about opinions and beliefs on a wide range of topics, and the question wording is intentionally kept fixed over time to be able to conduct meaningful time-series analyses. One of the questions concerns welfare spending. Respondents are asked whether they believe -too much,‖ -too little,‖ or the -right amount‖ is being spent on welfare. The exact question is shown in Table 4. 14 Table 4 . General social survey question on welfare preferences Fig. 4 shows how the answers to these questions have changed over the period . There was a pronounced shift against welfare in the mid-1970s, just after the welfare caseload explosion of the late 1960s and early 1970s. Attitudes liberalized gradually over the latter half of the 1970s and early 1980s, leveled off in the mid-1980s, and have recently taken another turn against welfare. The means of these questions over the period are shown in Table 1 , which indicates that about 52% of the population believed spending was too high, 19% believed spending was too low, and the residual 29% believed spending was at the right level. It should be noted that the percent of the sample wishing to lower spending exceeds 50% in some years according to Fig. 4 and nearly 52% of the sample in all years wished to do so, seemingly violating the median voter equilibrium assumption. However, these percentages are from the full national sample and hence are implicitly weighted by state population. When data by individual state in each year are examined, the proportions answering -too much‖ or -too little‖ rarely exceed 50%; the average fraction (across all states and years) answering -too much‖ is 47.3% and that answering -too little‖ is 21.5%. This suggests that the answers to the questions are being given relative to within-state factors; that is, that they are within-state preferences.
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Taking the answers to the GSS questions as proxies for B is *, our primary goal is to determine the characteristics of the median-preference individual. The most straightforward approach would be to select the individual from the GSS in each state in each year who has the median value of the GSS question, but this is not possible both because the preference variable is categorical -and hence the median person cannot be uniquely identified from the individuals in the middle category replying that the -right amount‖ is being spent on welfare -and because the GSS sample sizes are too small to permit a reliable estimate by state and year. Our approach is, instead, to estimate a benefit-preference equation on the GSS as a function of income and other characteristics (i.e., the variables in Eq. 11) using the technique of ordered probit, which yields estimates of a continuous, latent preference index; and then to apply that estimated equation to the Current Population Survey (CPS) to select an individual in each state in each year who has the median value of the predicted index. The CPS has much larger sample sizes by state and year (generally no fewer than 300 or 400, and up to 6000) and hence will yield more reliable estimates.
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Estimates of the individual welfare preference models using the GSS data are shown in Table 5 (we pool the data over all years 1973-1990, giving us 16 339 observations) . For the dependent variable we classify the answer -too much‖ spending on welfare as the lowest category on the scale and -too little‖ as the highest category so that the coefficients will represent effects on increased spending. The independent variables we include are listed in Table 1 . Each specification contains a full set of state dummies interacted with year dummies. The inclusion of this full set of dummies allows us to obtain the effects of individual-level characteristics on preferences using entirely within-state variation, which, as we noted earlier, is the way the GSS question is answered. Table 5 . Individual-level analysis of the determinants of welfare demand in the GSS In our first specification we restrict ourselves to variables that are in the GSS but also in the CPS. Price is omitted because, within-state, it has no variation if uniform taxation is assumed and is a linear function of income if proportional income taxation is assumed, in which case the income coefficient will absorb its effects.
The first two rows in the table show a spline for family income, which is shown to have a negative effect on benefit preferences, an effect which tapers off with income. The spline break point of $20 000 is chosen on the basis of Fig. 5 , which plots the GSS questions versus income. Apart from normal sampling variance, which induces some fluctuations in the relationship, the figure shows that support for welfare benefits declines rapidly initially and then levels off as income rises. The negative relationship between income and benefit preferences clearly supports a self-interest interpretation of preferences. The breakeven level of the AFDC income (i.e., the eligibility income level) is not far from $20 000 in many states, which further supports this interpretation. The negative income result is also consistent with a -social distance‖ interpretation of preferences for redistribution, whereby those farther away, on the income scale, from the poor are less able to empathize with the poor. Within the context of the social distance interpretation, the failure of support for benefits to turn up at higher incomes signals that altruistic motives are insufficiently strong to offset the combination of increased social distance and higher tax prices. The negative income coefficients found here are not inconsistent with the positive income effects found in the aggregate analysis in part because the GSS coefficients incorporate price effects, but also because they do not measure the same thing as those in the aggregate analysis. The income coefficients in the GSS reflect the fact that higher income individuals have different preferences for redistribution, perhaps for the relative income or social distance reasons we have suggested; but this is not the same as increasing the income of a fixed individual, holding that individual's preferences fixed. The latter can be positive while the former is negative. This is, in econometric terms, a case of a conventional individual fixed effects model where the omitted fixed effect in a single cross-section, which may represent relative income, is negatively correlated with income but cancels out in a fixed effects, or first-difference, model.
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The other coefficients in column (1) are also of interest because they imply a mixture of altruistic, social distance, and self-interest motivations for benefit preference. That higher benefits are preferred by those with larger family sizes, who are unmarried, who are black, and who do less work all suggest self-interest motives because these variables are all positively correlated with the probability of being on AFDC (a social distance interpretation also could be given to these results). 20 On the other hand, that higher benefits are preferred by those with higher education and by men is counter to self-interest explanations, and at least the education effect might reflect altruistic preferences acquired through schooling.
It is of interest to compare the effects of the individual sociodemographic characteristics here with those in Table 2 , even though the comparison is complicated by the same considerations we discussed for income (namely, the coefficients here may be picking up preferences rather than their effects holding preferences fixed). For example, percent black is strongly negative in Table 2 but positive in Table 5 . One explanation for this difference is that the Table 2 variable is a proxy for a higher black representation in the welfare caseload, and a consequent negative attitude by white voters, while the Table 5 variable is proxying attitudes toward welfare by black voters. 21 The college and age variables also have different signs in the two Tables. This should generate some concern that the state-level demographic variables in Table 2 are spuriously measuring factors other than voting preferences. Table 6 shows the coefficients on several additional variables added to the model. These variables are in the GSS but not in the CPS; nevertheless, they are informative and of independent interest because they consider a broader range of potential influences on welfare preferences. 22 The estimates in column 1 show that those who were unemployed or who received government assistance in the past are more supportive of welfare, consistent with self-interest or social distance motives. 23 Column 2 adds variables which indicate respondents' family values, opinions about the rewards from work, and views of own income relative to the average. Those with more conservative opinions regarding the role of women in the home and premarital sex are less supportive of welfare. Respondents who think that -lucky breaks or help from others‖, as opposed to hard work, are most important in getting ahead, are more supportive of welfare. Those who consider their income to be -far below average‖, and to a lesser extent those who consider their income to be -below average‖, are more supportive of welfare than those with average or better-than-average incomes. This last result is consistent with our argument that redistribution preferences depend upon relative position in the income distribution. The estimated effects of the political variables in column 3 are not surprising. Democratic party affiliation and politically liberal views are positively correlated with redistribution preferences. Independents support welfare more strongly than Republicans (the omitted category is those claiming another, or no, party affiliation) but not as strongly as Democrats. Table 6 . Individual-level analysis of the determinants of welfare demand in the GSS: additional variables .2. State-level regressions using median characteristics Table 7 shows estimates of state-level models identical in all respects to that in Table 2 , column (4) except that per capita income is replaced by various forms of median income or the income of the individual with median welfare preferences. The final column also includes the other characteristics of the median-preference individual. To determine the income and other characteristics of that individual, we apply the estimates from Table 5 to the March files of the CPS from 1969 to 1992 and order the individuals in the CPS in each state in each year by their predicted benefit-preference index from the ordered probit. We then select the individual in the median of this distribution. 24 Initial inspection of the data revealed that there was considerable fluctuation of individual characteristics in the neighborhood of the median-preference individual; that this could cause difficulties was confirmed by initial testing of these variables in the state-level regressions, which showed all coefficients to be insignificant. Therefore, we instead selected the central 10% of the preference distribution (i.e., all individuals 5% above and below the median) and averaged their characteristics for use in the state-level regressions. As in column (4) of Table 2 , each specification includes year and state fixed effects and state demographics. Table 7 . State-level regression analysis of the determinants of AFDC benefits: alternative measures of median voter's income Column (1) of Table 7 simply replaces state-level mean income by the state median income taken from the CPS, an accurate application of the median voter theorem if the median-preference individual is in fact the person with median income. The income coefficient is approximately the same as in Table 2 but is more significant, while the price and wage coefficients are somewhat more different in magnitude but retain the same level of significance. The major conclusion we draw from this result is that the use of mean rather than median income does not make much of a difference and, most important for our purposes, does not affect the estimated influence of the unskilled wage on benefits.
In the second column we replace the median income variable by the income of the median-preference individual. The point estimate of the income effect is lower than in column (1) and loses significance, although the two are not significantly different because of the fairly large standard errors. The low-skill wage and price coefficients are now even closer to their counterparts in column 4 of Table 2 . The interesting similarity between these results and those in column (1) arises in part because we found benefit preferences to be monotonic in income and in part because the other individual characteristics that have influenced the determination of the median-preference individual are fairly highly correlated with income.
In column (3) we make an attempt to adjust for the fact that not all individuals vote. Since voting probabilities are correlated with income and other characteristics, the individual with median preferences is not exactly the same as the voter with median preferences. We use a question in the GSS asking respondents whether they voted in the most recent Presidential election to estimate probit equations for the probability of voting, as a function of the same variables in our welfare preference equation; we then apply that equation to the individuals in the CPS to obtain predicted voting probabilities, which we then use with the individual-specific predicted welfare preferences to calculate a weighted median-preference individual. Column (3) shows the results using the average income of those within the 10% band of that person. The similarity of these results to those in column (2) shows our results to be robust to the incorporation of voter selectivity.
In the final column we return to the specification with the income of the median-preference individual but now also add the associated individual-level socioeconomic characteristics of that person (coefficients not shown). The income coefficient remains smaller in magnitude than that in Table 2 but is also insignificant, and the price and wage coefficients are not much affected by this expanded specification.
To conclude, therefore, we find that our exercise in applying a more accurate version of the median voter model using individual-level preference data does not affect the results on the main issue in our paper, namely, the estimated effect of the unskilled wage on observed benefits. The distortions introduced by using state-level median income and state-level mean demographics do not significantly affect the relationship of the wage to the benefit level. However, the analysis of the GSS has provided some interesting evidence on the individual-level correlates of welfare preferences in general which may be useful in future research on other aspects of this topic.
Sensitivity tests
Finally, we report the results of conducting a variety of sensitivity tests to the model, many of which we have referred to in passing. The sensitivity tests often affect some estimated parameters of our model but, as we will conclude, they show the coefficient on the unskilled wage, which is our major concern, to be quite robust. We conduct our tests on the model specified in the last column of Table 7 but we show only the low-skill wage coefficient for brevity. The first test we perform uses the AFDC guarantee for a family of four as the dependent variable rather than AFDC benefits per person. As Table 8 indicates, this reduces the wage effect slightly, but it remains significant and of the same general magnitude as in Table 7 . Table 8 . State-level regression analysis of the determinants of AFDC benefits: sensitivity analysis of the effect of low-skill wages Next, we add the 75th percentile of household income in the state to the equation both to crudely test the median voter assumption (because other percentile points should be insignificant) and also to test whether the unskilled wage, because it may reflect a general increase in variance, is partly picking up the effects of increased dispersion in the upper tail of the income distribution. This change also has little effect on the estimated low-skill wage coefficient. However, the coefficient on the 75th-percentile income variable is itself quite significant, inconsistent with the median voter assumption (coefficient=0.168, s.e.=0.084).
We next conduct several tests using alternative measures of the low-skill wage. We test the 10th percentile wage rather than the 25th percentile; the real hourly wage instead of the real weekly wage; the wage for highschool dropouts; and even household income at the 25th percentile rather than the individual wage. We also test whether using a state-level cost-of-living index (McMahon, 1991) to adjust for differences in cost of living affects the results. 25 As Table 8 shows, these variations generate a range of wage estimates of 0.098-0.268, which are generally somewhat lower than the coefficient in Table 7 . However, all effects remain positive and highly significant.
We next test the effect of using the female weekly wage instead of the overall wage as a simple test of the potential for endogeneity of the wage in the model. To the extent that welfare benefit levels affect labor supply of women, the equilibrium wage in the state labor market may be partly a result of benefits rather than their cause. In particular, higher benefits may reduce labor supply and increase the wage, leading to a spuriously positive relationship. If this effect is present, we should expect the wage coefficient to be larger when the female wage rather than the overall wage is used because over 90% of welfare adults are women. As Table 8 shows, the opposite appears to be the case -the coefficient actually falls when the female wage is used (though it remains positive and significant). We take this is as an indication that significant feedback effects on the wage are unlikely to be present. 26 We next conduct two tests for possible endogeneity of the state tax price. Since that price is a function of the caseload (although lagged), which is no doubt responsive to benefits, the potential for endogeneity is clear. This issue has been heavily discussed in the literature on AFDC benefit determination at the state level (see Ribar and Wilhelm, 1996 , for a recent review). We first provide instrumental variable estimates using the ratio of men to women aged 15-44 (the sex ratio should affect recipiency rates) and the state financing share as instruments for price. 27 In addition, to avoid having to make assumptions about legitimate instruments, we simply estimate a reduced form version by removing the recipiency rate from the price definition altogether, leaving only the state financing share. 28 If recipiency is endogenous and if the consequent bias affects the wage coefficient as well as the price coefficient, the wage coefficient should be significantly altered in this specification. As Table 8 indicates, however, neither of these tests has much of an effect on the wage coefficient at all. Therefore we find no evidence of price endogeneity problems that are connected to our estimated wage effects.
Finally, we relax the restrictions in the simple fixed effects version of our cross-state, over-time panel model by introducing serial correlation in the error term through an AR(1) specification, thus accounting for within-state correlation. This introduction reduces the magnitude of the low-skill wage effect slightly, but it remains positive and highly significant.
Conclusions
In this paper we have tested whether the decline in welfare benefits in the U.S. over the last twenty five years can be partly attributed to reductions in the wage rates of unskilled workers at the bottom of the wage distribution. Our results, based on conventional state fixed effects models, provide considerable support for the hypothesis. The result is strong enough that it can be seen from unconditional relationships between changes in unskilled wages and AFDC benefits across states from the 1970s to the 1980s, and it is robust to the inclusion of a number of other variables. In addition, our analysis illustrated a new method of implementing median voter models when direct individuallevel information on preferences is available. We used those data to determine who the median preference individual in the jurisdiction actually is to avoid some of the difficulties attendant upon using aggregate-level income and other characteristics to proxy those of the median individual. Our wage effects on benefits remain positive in this exercise and in additional sensitivity testing of the model as well.
There are several areas in which further work would be fruitful. For instance, the availability of individual preference data opens the possibility of estimating alternatives to the median voter model, whereas in our paper, and in the previous literature, the median voter model is a maintained hypothesis. However, the available preference data have limitations themselves. While our results suggest that self-interest or altruism filtered through social distance influences support for welfare, additional data are necessary to distinguish between these motives. Such data could also be gathered for the purpose of discerning which of the voter concerns (work disincentives or equity) we have discussed is the most important factor underlying the low-skill wage effect. Alternatively, this question might be approached from a reexamination of the low-skill wage effect in the years following the 1996 welfare reform which should serve to mitigate voter concern about welfare's work disincentives.
